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The capacity to trust wisely is a critical facilitator of success and prosperity, and it has been
conjectured that people of higher intelligence were better able to detect signs of untrustworthi-
ness from potential partners. In contrast, this article reports five Trust Game studies suggesting
that reading trustworthiness off the faces of strangers is a modular process. Trustworthiness
detection from faces is independent of general intelligence (Study 1) and effortless (Study 2).
Pictures that include non-facial features such as hair and clothing impair trustworthiness de-
tection (Study 3) by increasing reliance on conscious judgments (Study 4), but people largely
prefer to make decisions from this sort of pictures (Study 5). In sum, trustworthiness detec-
tion in an economic interaction is a genuine and effortless ability, possessed in equal amount
by people of all cognitive capacities, but whose impenetrability leads to inaccurate conscious
judgments and inappropriate informational preferences.
Trust is a critical facilitator of cooperation, and the cor-
nerstone of prosperous societies (Zak & Knack, 2001). The
problem with trust, though, is that it cannot be given out
indiscriminately, for it can easily be abused. An important
challenge for the social and cognitive sciences is thus to lay
bare the processes that allow people to trust wisely. Ac-
cordingly, the issues of trust, trustworthiness and trustwor-
thiness detection have garnered growing attention from mul-
tiple fields within and beyond psychology. One view that is
currently gaining momentum is the Intelligence-Trust con-
jecture (Sturgis, Read, & Allum, 2010), or the assumption
that smarter individuals are better at detecting signs of un-
trustworthiness in social and economic situations. It was
found that the general propensity to trust correlates with in-
telligence (Sturgis et al., 2010; Schoon & Cheng, 2011; Se-
gal & Hershberger, 1999), with a greater ability at trusting
wisely (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999), and with life
achievements (Delhey & Newton, 2003; Paxton, 2007). The
Intelligence-Trust conjecture makes sense of this array of
findings by assuming that smarter individuals do not neces-
sarily start trusting more than others, but experience greater
success with their trust decisions. Being better equipped
to detect signs of untrustworthiness in potential interaction
partners, they would allocate their trust wisely and experi-
ence positive reinforcement about trusting others. Over the
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course of a lifetime, they would accordingly end up being
more trusting and more prosperous.
The Intelligence-Trust conjecture has never been sub-
jected to direct and rigorous experimental testing (Sturgis et
al., 2010; Evans & Krueger, 2010), and it could appear at
odds with results derived from the evolutionary approach to
social exchange (Cosmides, Barrett, & Tooby, 2010). It has
been suggested that the human mind has tackled the evolu-
tionary problem of social exchange by developing a special-
ized module for cheater detection, which does not rely on
central cognitive processing. Cheater detection is thought to
be unrelated to general intelligence, undemanding in cogni-
tive resources, and impenetrable to consciousness. It would
seem plausible that the mind developed broadly similar cog-
nitive architectures for detecting trustworthiness and for de-
tecting cheaters (Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007).
As an implication, and pace the Intelligence-Trust conjec-
ture, trustworthiness detection (TD) would be fairly rou-
tinized and independent of general intelligence. The goal
of this article is to explore this hypothesis. Our paradigm
for measuring TD is the classic Trust Game (Berg, Dickhaut,
& McCabe, 1995). In this game a player (the Investor) is
endowed with an amount of money and decides whether she
will transfer this endowment to another player (the Trustee).
If the endowment is transferred, it is multiplied by a factor,
and the Trustee then decides how much to send back to the
Investor. In a sense, the Investor is betting on the trustwor-
thiness of the Trustee: A perfectly accurate performance at
TD would allow Investors to transfer to those and only those
Trustees whose decision is to reciprocate.
Recent research on TD in the trust game has focused on
the signals that Investors pick from the Trustees’ facial fea-
tures. Faces are rapidly appraised for trustworthiness (Yang,
Qi, Ding, & Song, 2011) and this initial appraisal strongly
influences subsequent decisions in the trust game, in the
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short term (van’t Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and in the long term
(Chang, Doll, van’t Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010). Most
interestingly, the face might offer valid cues to trustworthi-
ness. For example, people can accurately discriminate co-
operators from non-cooperators based on a picture of their
face at the moment they were pondering whether to cooper-
ate (Verplaetse et al., 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Fur-
thermore, men with greater facial width are perceived as less
trustworthy, and it turns out that they are less likely to honor
trust in the trust game (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010). This prior ev-
idence suggests that people can read trustworthiness off the
face of their economic partners. The current article offers a
series of experiments that triangulate the cognitive nature of
TD, seeking evidence for its automaticity and encapsulation.
Although not all evolved modules possess these two features
(Barrett, Frederick, Haselton, & Kurzban, 2006), their pres-
ence is a strong indication that central processing is not in-
volved. Note that even if TD turns out to be a module it could
still be used for the detection of a range of personality traits
besides trustworthiness, an issue to which we will get back
in the final section of this article.
If TD is automatic and encapsulated then Investors of
higher general intelligence should have no advantage at TD;
TD should be impervious to concurrent cognitive load; accu-
rate TD should be decoupled from conscious trustworthiness
judgments; and Investors should be oblivious to the boundary
conditions of accurate TD. Finding evidence for automaticity
and encapsulation would put us in a strong position to claim
that accurate TD is a modular rather than central process.
Study 1: Intelligence and
trustworthiness detection
To investigate whether more intelligent Investors would be
better at TD, we took the pictures of 60 Trustees and recorded
their strategies. We could thus identify 35 ‘reciprocators’
(returning more than what they were transfered), 7 ‘abusers’
(returning zero), and 18 neutral Trustees (returning the exact
amount that was transfered). Trustees’ strategies and pic-
tures were taken from a previous study (Centorrino, Djemai,
Hopfensitz, Milinski, & Seabright, 2011) in which 79 young
adults (aged between 18 and 35 years) were familiarized with
the Trust Game and asked to play the role of Trustee. They
were informed that the Investor would be endowed with an
amount of money which was multiplied by the factor 3 in
case the Investor decided to transfer the endowment. Par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how much they would send
back in case the Investor transferred the endowment. They
were given three options: return zero euro, return the exact
amount that was transferred, or return half of the new global
amount. All trustees were clearly informed that they would
be randomly paired with one Investor and receive the money
they made based on their strategy. Pictures were extracted
from movies that were recorded of Trustees after they had
been informed about the general structure of the game.
For the present paper we selected 60 pictures (30 male
and 30 female) from the original 79 Trustees. Abusers and
reciprocators were naturally matched for age, as all Trustees
were young adults recruited on campus. The 60 pictures were
selected so that the proportion of abusers and reciprocators
would be similar for male Trustees (4 abusers, 18 reciproca-
tors) and female Trustees (3 abusers, 17 reciprocators). To
increase homogeneity in our pictures set, we avoided pic-
tures of distinctively non-Caucasian Trustees, and pictures
of Trustees whose facial expression was not neutral enough.
Method
A total of 208 undergraduates from the University of Leu-
ven (Belgium) were familiarized with the Trust Game and
asked to play the role of Investor. They played 60 single shot
games, each time with a different Trustee. Participants were
endowed with 4 euro on each game. Each game started with
a fixation cross that was presented for 1000 ms. Next, the
picture of the Trustee was presented for 5500 ms. As in pre-
vious studies, we presented black-and-white pictures of the
Trustees’ faces that were cropped to minimize any display of
clothing or hairstyle. The horizontal cropping points were
set at the left and right facial boundary. Vertical cropping
points were the chin and top of the eyebrows, respectively
(Figure 1A). After the presentation of the picture participants
were asked whether they wanted to transfer their money to
the Trustee or not by pressing 1 (transfer) or 2 (no transfer).
After participants entered their response they were asked to
press the space bar whenever they were ready to start the next
game. Participants did not receive feedback about their deci-
sions after each individual game. Participants were informed
that after the experiment one game would be randomly se-
lected and they would receive whatever money they made in
that game. Participants’ fluid Intelligence score was mea-
sured by means of the short version (14 items) of Raven’s
advanced progressive matrices (Bors & Stokes, 1998). The
test took about 20 minutes and participants completed it after
they finished the Trust Game. Scores range from 0 to 12 as
the first two items are conceived as practice trials.
Results
Trustworthiness detection. Investors transfered money to
41% of the abusers (SE = 1.4) and 46% of the reciproca-
tors (SE = 1.7), an effect size h = 0.10. Figure 2A displays
the average transfer rates to reciprocators and abusers as a
function of the Raven score of the Trustees (bottom half and
top half of the distribution). We ran an analysis of variance
with Tranfer rate as the dependent variable, Trustee’s strat-
egy as a within-subject factor, and Raven score as a covari-
ate. The analysis detected a main effect of Trustee’s strat-
egy, F(1, 206) = 13.3, p < .001. This effect was not mod-
erated by the Raven score of the Investors, F(1, 206) < 1,
p = .73, which itself did not have any detectable main ef-
fect, F(1, 206) < 1, p = .60.1 Study 1 thus demonstrates
that Investors were able to detect trustworthiness: Investors
were more likely to transfer to reciprocators than to abusers.
1 Raven scores spanned the full 0–12 range, M = 7.03, SD =
2.55. This distribution was similar to that observed in the Bors and
Stokes (1998) norming study for first-year undergraduates.
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Figure 1. Examples of experimental materials. (A) Cropped picture of a Trustee. (B) Full picture of the same Trustee. (C) A dot pattern
used in the Load condition. (D) A dot pattern used in the Control condition.
In line with our modular hypothesis, this ability was unre-
lated with a standard measure of intelligence. Individuals
with lower Raven scores were as capable of detecting trust-
worthiness as individuals with higher Raven scores.
Additional results. We ran a supplementary analysis of
variance on Transfer rates in which we introduced Trustee’s
gender as an additional within-subject factor. Results were
robust to the introduction of this control variable. The
analysis again detected a main effect of Trustee’s Strategy,
F(1, 206) = 15.3, p < .001; no main effect of the Raven
score, F(1, 206) < 1, p = .61; and no interaction be-
tween Trustee’s strategy and Raven score, F(1, 206) < 1,
p = .69. The analysis detected two additional effects: a main
effect of Trustee’s gender (more transfer to female Trustees),
F(1, 206) = 9.9, p = .002, qualified by an interaction with
Trustee’s strategy, F(1, 206) = 19.0, p < .001, reflecting
greater trustworthiness detection for female faces in our sam-
ple. We also ran an analysis of variance with response speed
as the dependent variable, Trustee’s strategy as a within-
subject factor, and Raven score as a covariate. This analy-
sis indicated that Investors were faster when presented with
pictures of abusers (1.28 faces per second, SE = 0.05), than
when presented with pictures of reciprocators (1.00 face per
second, SE = 0.03). This difference was statistically sig-
nificant, F(1, 206) = 35.6, p < .001. It was not moder-
ated by the Raven score, F(1, 206) < 1, p = .40, which
itself did not have any detectable effect on response speed,
F(1, 206) = 2.1, p = .15.
Study 2: Trustworthiness
detection and concurrent
cognitive load
In a second experiment, we tested whether TD was im-
peded by cognitive load: if TD does not involve central ex-
ecutive processing, then it should remain accurate even when
Investors are cognitively burdened by a concurrent task. To
test this hypothesis, we ran a replication of the first study on
an independent sample of 93 Investors, in which we intro-
duced a cognitive load manipulation.
Method
A total of 93 undergraduates from the University of Leu-
ven (Belgium) played the same Trust Game as in Study 1,
under concurrent cognitive load. Before the picture of the
Trustee was shown, a dot pattern in a 3 × 3 matrix was flashed
for 900 ms. Participants had to keep the pattern in memory
while they saw the picture and made their transfer decision.
After participants had entered their transfer response they
were presented with an empty matrix and had to indicate the
location of the dots. Participants were randomly assigned to
the Load and Control group. In the Load group the matrix
was filled with a complex 4-dot pattern (see Figure 1C for an
example), whose storage efficiently taps executive resources
(Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; De
Neys, 2006). In the control group the pattern consisted of
three dots on a horizontal or vertical line (see Figure 1D
for an example), whose storage places but a minimal burden
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Figure 2. Main experimental results. Error bars show standard error of the mean. The horizontal lines in A and B display the transfer rates
to neutral trustees, who send back the exact amount they were transferred. (A) Investors transfer more to Trustees who privately decided to
reciprocate, than to Trustees who privately decided to abuse, and this capacity to detect trustworthiness is independent of Investors’ Raven
scores of fluid intelligence. (B) Investors transfer more to Trustees who privately decided to reciprocate, than to Trustees who privately
decided to abuse, and this capacity to detect trustworthiness is resistant to concurrent cognitive load. (C) Transfer decisions are almost
exclusively predicted by explicit ratings of trustworthiness in the full picture trust game (in which trustworthiness detection fails), much less
so in the cropped picture trust game (in which trustworthiness detection is more successful). Abusers are represented by black dots.
on executive resources. Participants were familiarized with
the dot memorization task before the Trust Game started, on
two practice trials. Training instructions stressed that it was
crucial that the dot pattern was reproduced correctly in the
upcoming task. After each individual Trust Game trial par-
ticipants also got feedback about their memorization perfor-
mance.
Results
Dot matrix task. The concurrent memorization task was
properly performed. The mean number of correctly localized
dots for the complex dot pattern was 3.74 (out of 4, SE =
0.03) and 2.91 (out of 3, SE = 0.01) for the simple pattern in
the control condition. Thus, overall, about 94% of complex
patterns and 97% of simple patterns were reproduced cor-
rectly. These high accuracy rates confirm that participants
did as instructed, and engaged executive resources into the
memorization task.
Trustworthiness detection. Overall, Investors transfered
money to 41% of the abusers (SE = 2.6) and 48% of the
reciprocators (SE = 2.1), an effect size h = 0.14. As shown
in Figure 2B, the difference in transfer rates was present both
in the control condition and under complex concurrent load.
We ran an analysis of variance with Tranfer rate as the de-
pendent variable, Trustee’s strategy as a within-subject fac-
tor, and Load as a between-subject factor. The analysis de-
tected a main effect of Trustee’s strategy, F(1, 91) = 14.3,
p < .001. This effect was not moderated by concurrent load,
F(1, 91) < 1, p = .60, which itself did not have any de-
tectable main effect, F(1, 91) < 1, p = .52. Study 2 thus
confirms that Investors are able to detect trustworthiness, and
that this capacity is robust to concurrent cognitive load.
Additional results. We ran a supplementary analysis of
variance on Transfer rates in which we introduced Trustee’s
gender as an additional within-subject factor. Results were
robust to the introduction of this control variable. The
analysis again detected a main effect of Trustee’s Strategy,
F(1, 91) = 15.2, p < .001; no main effect of load, F(1, 91) <
1, p = .46; and no interaction between Trustee’s strategy
and concurrent load, F(1, 91) < 1, p = .76. There was no
main effect of Trustee’s gender, F(1, 91) = 1.6, p = .21, but
the analysis detected an interaction between Trustee’s gen-
der and Trustee’s strategy, F(1, 91) = 16.5, p < .001, re-
flecting greater trustworthiness detection for female faces in
our sample. An analysis of variance conducted on response
speed (as a function of Trustee’s strategy and load group) in-
THE MODULAR NATURE OF TRUSTWORTHINESS DETECTION 5
dicated that Investors were faster when presented with pic-
tures of abusers (1.04 faces per second, SE = 0.05), than
when presented with pictures of reciprocators (0.94 face per
second, SE = 0.04). This difference was statistically signif-
icant, F(1, 91) = 4.6, p < .05. It was not moderated by
cognitive load, F(1, 91) < 1, p = .37, which itself did not
have any detectable effect on response speed, F(1, 91) < 1,
p = .81.
Study 3: Extension to real-life
pictures
In line with previous research (Stirrat & Perrett, 2010), our
first and second studies used cropped, black-and-white and
standardized for size versions of Trustees’ pictures, which
did not reveal clothing or hairstyle (Figure 1A). Colored pic-
tures displaying clothing and hairstyle provide additional in-
formation about Trustees. To the best of our knowledge,
there is no prior evidence that this information is useful, ir-
relevant or misleading when assessing trustworthiness. How-
ever, and in any case, it is possible that the link between intel-
ligence and TD might be weakened when little information is
provided, and detectable when more information is provided,
giving a role after all to intelligence in TD. In order to con-
trol for that possibility, we ran a replication of our first study
with an independent sample of 180 Investors, in which we
used the unmodified colored pictures of Trustees that showed
clothing and hairstyle (Figure 1B).
Method
A total of 180 undergraduates from the University of Leu-
ven (Belgium) played the same Trust Game as in Studies 1
and 2, with the original non-cropped color pictures that we
took from our sample of Trustees. As illustrated in Fig. 2B,
these full pictures displayed non-facial features such as cloth-
ing and hairstyle. Participants completed the same short ver-
sion of Raven’s advanced progressive matrices as in Study 1.
After the experiment we also asked participants to write
down what percentage of Trustees they generally expected
to abuse trust.
Results
Trustworthiness detection. Overall, Investors transfered
money to 49% of the abusers (SE = 1.5) and 51% of the
reciprocators (SE = 1.9), an effect size h = 0.04. Contrary to
what we observed in the first two studies, this difference was
not statistically significant. We ran an analysis of variance
with Tranfer rate as the dependent variable, Trustee’s strategy
as a within-subject factor, and Raven score as a covariate.
There was no effect of Trustee’s strategy, F(1, 178) = 1.9,
p = .17, no effect of the Raven score F(1, 178) = 1.3,
p = .25,2 and no significant interaction, F(1, 178) < 1,
p = .56. This result suggests that TD was impaired when
Investors were presented with full pictures. In order to fur-
ther investigate this possibility, we conducted an additional
analysis comparing TD in Studies 1 and 2 (cropped pictures)
and TD in Study 3 (full pictures). Running such a between-
study comparison was deemed appropriate, since the sam-
pled population, protocols and experimenters were the same
across studies.
Between-study comparison. The ANOVA (Transfer Rate
as the dependent variable, Trustee’s strategy as a 2-level
within-participant predictor, Study as a 3-level between-
participant predictor) detected a significant effect of Strategy,
F(1, 492) = 25.9, p < .001, and the expected interaction with
Study F(2, 492) = 3.3, p = .04. The analysis also detected a
significant effect of Study, reflecting the fact that participants
transferred more in Study 3, F(2, 492) = 4.6, p = .01.3
Additional results. We ran a supplementary analysis of
variance on Transfer rates in which we introduced Trustee’s
gender as an additional within-subject factor. Results were
robust to the introduction of this control variable. The analy-
sis did not detect any effect of Trustee’s Strategy, F(1, 178) =
1.1, p = .29; no main effect of the Raven score, F(1, 178) =
1.4, p = .23; and no interaction between Trustee’s strategy
and Raven score, F(1, 178) < 1, p = .49. In line with
what we already observed in studies 1 and 2, the analysis
detected two additional effects: a main effect of Trustee’s
gender (more transfer to female Trustees), F(1, 178) = 54,
p < .001, qualified by an interaction with Trustee’s strategy,
F(1, 178) = 19.0, p < .001, reflecting better TD for female
faces in our sample, F(1, 178) = 4.8, p = .03. We also ran
an analysis of variance with response speed as the depen-
dent variable, Trustee’s strategy as a within-subject factor,
and Raven score as a covariate. Interestingly, this analysis
indicated that Investors were slower to make their decisions
when presented with pictures of abusers (1.16 faces per sec-
ond, SE = 0.05), than when presented with pictures of re-
ciprocators (1.32 faces per second, SE = 0.04). This differ-
ence was statistically significant, F(1, 178) = 8.7, p = .004.
It was not moderated by the Raven score, F(1, 178) = 3,
p = .08, which itself did not have any detectable effect on
response speed, F(1, 178) < 1, p = .33. The interaction term
that comes close to significance reflects a slight tendency for
high-Raven subjects to be faster for reciprocators’ pictures
and slower for abuser’s pictures, but the corresponding cor-
relation coefficients are very low (.02 and −.11, respectively).
The significant main response speed effect suggests that In-
vestors might retain a gut feeling that some of the Trustees
should not be trusted, witness their slower decisions for faces
of would-be abusers. But clearly this feeling does not result
on a decision not to trust. Finally, note that in Study 3 we also
explicitly asked participants to write down what percentage
2 Raven scores spanned the full 0–12 range, M = 7.05, SD =
2.57. This distribution was similar to that observed in the Bors and
Stokes (1998) norming study for first-year undergraduates.
3 Another option to test the effect of picture type in our studies
is to run an ANOVA with Transfer Rate as the dependent variable,
Trustee’s Strategy as a 2-level within-participant predictor, and Pic-
ture Type as a 2-level between-participant predictor. The results of
this analysis are similar to that we report in the main text.
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of Trustees they generally expected to abuse trust. We ob-
served that subjects with higher Raven scores expected less
abuse (r = −.21, p = .005), with the top-quartile expecting
36% abuse, and the lower quartile expecting 47% abuse. This
confirms that more cognitively capable subjects, just as in
previous research (Sturgis et al., 2010), had a greater propen-
sity to think of others as trustworthy. However, the key point
is that this propensity did not translate into behavior, as more
cognitively capable subjects did not transfer more than other
subjects. Note that this finding helps to allay potential con-
cerns about our measure of intelligence: Arguably, if the 12-
item Raven score captures the effect of intelligence on trust
attitudes, it should be able to capture the effect of intelligence
on TD.
Study 4: Explicit trustworthiness
judgments
Our next test focuses on the decoupling of TD and ex-
plicit trustworthiness judgments. In line with our modular
hypothesis, we suspect that explicit judgments about whether
a Trustee is trustworthy (as compared to decisions to transfer
money to that Trustee) might not be a good predictor of the
Trustee’s strategy. That is, if TD is an encapsulated process
in which Investors have no insight, their trusting decisions
might be more accurate than their explicit trustworthiness
judgments.
Method
A total of 80 undergraduates from the University of Leu-
ven (Belgium) were asked to rate how trustworthy each
Trustee looked on a 7-point rating scale (-3 to +3). The exact
same pictures that were presented in our Trust Games were
presented to the participants. Each rating trial started with a
fixation cross that was presented for 1000 ms. Next, the pic-
ture was presented and participants wrote down their rating
on a scoring sheet. In addition to the trustworthiness rating
we also asked the participants to rate how intelligent, attrac-
tive, and aggressive the Trustee looked. These additional rat-
ings were not intended to be used for the present study but
we note here that abusers and reciprocators did not signifi-
cantly differ on any of these ratings. When participants were
finished rating a picture they pressed the space bar and the
next trial started. Half of the participants rated the cropped
pictures that were used in Studies 1 and 2, the other half rated
the full pictures that were used in Study 3. Each participant
rated a total of 30 pseudo-randomly selected faces. The ran-
domization procedure guaranteed that each picture was rated
by exactly 40 participants.
Results
Trustworthiness detection. In line with our hypothesis,
abusers and reciprocators were rated as equally trustworthy-
looking, for cropped pictures as well as full pictures. If
anything, abusers obtained slightly greater average ratings
of trustworthiness than reciprocators, for cropped pictures
(Mab = 0.55, Mre = 0.48) as well as full pictures (Mab =
0.59, Mre = 0.44). We ran an analysis of variance on pic-
tures, with trustworthiness ratings as the dependent variable,
Trustee’s strategy as a between-item factor, and Picture type
as a repeated factor. This analysis did not detect any signifi-
cant main effect or interaction effect, all F < 1, all p > .80.
Introducing Trustee’s gender as an additional between-item
variable in the analysis did not impact results, but yielded
a significant interaction between Picture Type and Trustee’s
gender, F(1, 38) = 6.2, p = .02. This result would appear
to reflect the fact that females looked more trustworthy than
males from full pictures (M f = 0.94, Mm = 0.03, t(40) =
2.73, p = .01), whereas females and males looked equally
trustworthy from cropped pictures (M f = 0.58, Mm = 0.41,
t(40) = 0.44, p = .66).
Additional results. An additional analysis helps to under-
stand why TD was more accurate with cropped pictures than
with full pictures. As manifest in Figure 2C, explicit trust-
worthiness ratings provided about the full pictures predicted
80% of the variance of transfer decisions in Study 3 (r = .90,
p < .001), whereas explicit trustworthiness ratings provided
about the cropped pictures predicted only 18% of the vari-
ance of transfer decisions in Study 1 (r = .43, p = .005).
This suggests that subjects playing with the full pictures
largely relied on explicit trustworthiness judgments, for im-
paired performance, whereas subjects playing with cropped
pictures did not rely as much on explicit judgments, for better
performance.4
Study 5: Inappropriate
preferences
Investors in the first study (who made decisions from
cropped, black-and-white pictures), detected trustworthiness
better than Investors in the third study, who saw full (and
colored) pictures. If TD is an encapsulated process in which
Investors have no conscious insight, they might not be able to
realize that cropped, black-and-white pictures improve their
decisions, and they might manifest an inappropriate prefer-
ence for playing the game with full, colored pictures.
Method
A total of 67 voluntary undergraduates from University
College Sint-Lieven (Aalst, Belgium) were familiarized with
the Trust Game. They were shown two examples of the
cropped pictures and two examples of the original full pic-
tures of the same Trustees. The two cropped and two full
4 Taken together, the findings of Studies 3 and 4 raise an intrigu-
ing possibility, evoked by a reviewer. Investors in Study 3 were
slower to make their decisions when presented with the pictures of
abusers, as if they retained a gut feeling about their trustworthiness
but eventually went for a more explicit judgment. Because they
had 5500 ms to make a decision, they had ample time to search
for more cues in hairstyle and clothing. With a higher time pres-
sure, participants might have been more likely to follow their initial
gut feeling based on facial features. If this interpretation is correct,
then time pressure should improve trustworthiness detection from
full pictures.
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pictures were presented side by side on a single slide. We
randomly selected four Trustees from our group of recipro-
cators and four Trustees from our group of abusers. Two sets
of slides were created with each slide showing the picture of
one reciprocator and one abuser. Location of the cropped and
full version (right or left hand side of the slide) was counter-
balanced across the sets. Half of the participants were pre-
sented with Set 1, the other half with Set 2. Participants were
asked to write down whether they would prefer to play the
Trust Game with the pictures on the left or right hand side.
Results
Preferences did not differ across the two sets (p = .69).
In line with our hypothesis, 78% of Investors indicated that
they would prefer to play the game with full pictures (bino-
mial, p < .001). In sum, Investors did not seem to realize
that they would make more accurate transfer decisions from
cropped pictures. If Investors had conscious insight in TD
processes, they could have been expected to pick the type of
pictures that allowed them to make better decisions. The fact
that they picked the type of pictures that impairs the quality
of their decisions thus suggest that they had no conscious
insight in TD processes.
Discussion
The present studies established that people of all cognitive
capacities were equally capable of reading trustworthiness
off a stranger’s face (Study 1), and that this capacity was
robust to concurrent cognitive load (Study 2). This capac-
ity was impaired, however, by the presence of external fea-
tures such as hairstyle and clothing, and higher cognitive ca-
pacity did not protect from this detrimental effect (Study 3).
When these external features were present, trusting decisions
were almost perfectly predicted by explicit trustworthiness
judgments (Study 4), for degraded performance. People did
not seem to be aware of this degraded performance, as they
largely preferred to rely on pictures that showed these exter-
nal features (Study 5).
Our five studies provide convergent evidence that trust-
worthiness detection (TD) from faces is an encapsulated, au-
tomatic process, in which people have little conscious in-
sight, and for which higher intelligence provides little ben-
efit.5 The Intelligence-Trust conjecture assumes that smarter
individuals do not necessarily start trusting more than oth-
ers, but experience greater reinforcement through better trust
decisions. The current results suggest to look for another
explanation of the positive association between higher intel-
ligence and the greater propensity to trust, since accurate TD
appears to be a matter of gut feelings rather than reflective en-
gagement. Maybe the next simplest explanation is that more
intelligent subjects have early incentives to try out trusting
others, and that trust is a self-reinforcing attitude: Few peo-
ple, at least in laboratory studies such as ours, abuse the trust
they have been endowed with. If the base rate of trust ex-
ploitation is indeed low, any early factor (including parental
encouragement) that encourages to trust more will build up
on the long term into more trusting attitudes.
Another possibility is that intelligence impacts other as-
pects of TD than facial scrutiny: people of higher intelli-
gence would have no advantage at reading trustworthiness
off faces, but would be able to use other cues better than peo-
ple of lower intelligence. Although this possibility cannot be
ruled out, its explanatory power is limited by the enduring
strength of first impressions. Even in a courtroom environ-
ment, which put strong emphasis on the reflective evalua-
tion of credibility and trustworthiness, jurors make fast and
strong initial judgments based on a defendant’s face, which
influence the manner in which they process subsequent in-
formation (Porter, Gustaw, & ten Brinke, 2010). If first im-
pressions have a powerful and lasting influence on trust, and
if intelligence does not increase the accuracy of first impres-
sions, then the overall impact of intelligence on accurate TD
is likely to be limited.
The current results do tell us that TD from faces is a
genuine ability, though, and shed light on its strengths and
boundary conditions. As an automatic process, TD appears
to be relatively effortless, and independent of one’s cognitive
capacities. It is, however, quite fallible, witness the small
effect sizes obtained in Studies 1 and 2. Even though par-
ticipants could significantly detect trustworthiness, their per-
formance was not as good as that observed, for example, in
the Verplaetse et al. (2007) study where pictures were taken
at the moment the targets made their decisions to cooperate
or not. This suggests that the facial expression related to the
decision to cooperate could provide a more powerful cue to
trustworthiness than the face as such, and we cannot rule out
yet that intelligence might play a role in the processing of
this cue. Beyond facial expression, other verbal and behav-
ioral cues might be factored in everyday TD (or lie detection)
situations, and our data are silent as to whether some of these
cues might be processed centrally rather than in a modular
fashion.
Not only is TD fallible, but it seems easy to manipu-
late. This should not be a surprise, considering that Ponzi
schemers and other fraudsters make a living from failures of
TD. Bernard Madoff, who operated the largest documented
Ponzi scheme in history, was able to convince hundreds of
persons to trust him with their savings. Just as other suc-
cessful fraudsters, his scheme relied in part on his being per-
ceived as sincere, ingratiating and trustworthy. The Madoff
case, and similar if less publicized cases, should serve as a
warning not to adopt too rosy a view of the human ability at
TD.
In our studies, TD was overridden by external features
(e.g., hair), which people preferentially attended to, to the
detriment of the internal facial features that would have
served TD best. Although external facial features are known
to improve the detection of traits such as extraversion and
5 That is not to say that other factors might not moderate TD, be
they forms of intelligence not captured by the Raven test, or other
individual differences factors. In light of the lively debate about
whether some people have a better ability to spot liars than others
(O’Sullivan & Ekman, 2004), we should be careful not to hastily
rule out the possibility that some people might be better at TD than
others.
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physical health (Kramer & Ward, 2010), and thus carry use-
ful information in many situations, they appear to hurt TD
unbeknownst to trusters. This is an interesting element re-
garding the modularity of TD, since it makes it less likely
that the processes underlying TD would reflect the operation
of a general system for personality detection. That is not
to say, however, that the processes underlying TD cannot be
used for (or indeed, were not derived from) the detection of
other traits or dispositions, such as aggressiveness or domi-
nance. One challenge for future research will be to map the
cluster of dispositions that can and cannot be detected by the
same processes used for TD.
Finally, it is important to note that accurate TD was only
manifest in our studies in the decisions that people made,
and not in the explicit judgments that they expressed. This
asymmetry can help to explain why accurate TD from faces
was not always demonstrated in prior research. For example,
in one previous study (Porter, England, Juodis, ten Brinke,
& Wilson, 2008), subjects gave explicit judgments of trust-
worthiness based on faces that included some of America’s
most wanted criminals. Subjects were hardly capable of de-
tecting the untrustworthy character of these criminals from
their faces. Our data suggest that they might have been more
successful, if their task had been to make a decision about
whether they would trust these individuals with their money
or their safety. In sum, the present data suggest that the abil-
ity to detect trustworthiness from faces is automatic and en-
capsulated: it is real, effortless, and manifest in our deci-
sions; but it is fallible, impenetrable, and decoupled from
our conscious judgments. Future research can build on this
cognitive triangulation of TD processes to lay bare its devel-
opmental trajectory, its social moderators, its neural bases,
and its applied consequences.
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